
Log4Shell Log4J sebezhetőség

Java Brains: Log4J Vulnerability (Log4Shell) Explained - for Java developers alapján <u>The Log4j vulnerability and its impact on software supply chain security | Snyk</u> https://snyk.io/blog/log4j-vulnerability-software-supply-chain-security-log4shell/



CVE-2021-44228

HTTPS://WWW.WHITESOURCESOFTWARE.COM/VULNERABILITY-DATABASE/CVE-2021-44228

CVSS v3.1	CVSS v2	
		10.0
Base Score:		
Attack Vector (AV):	Network	
Attack Complexity (AC):	Low	
Privilegs Required (PR):	None	
User Interaction (UI):	None	
Scope (S):	Changed	
Confidentiality (C):	High	
Integrity (I):	High	
Availability (A):	High	
4		▶

CVE-2021-44228

HTTPS://WWW.WHITESOURCESOFTWARE.COM/VULNERABILITY-DATABASE/CVE-2021-44228

CVSS v3.1	CVSS v2	
		9.3
Base Score:		
Access Vector (AV):	Network	
Access Complexity (AC):	Medium	
Authentication (AU):	None	
Confidentiality (C):	Complete	
Integrity (I):	Complete	
Availability (A):	Complete	
Additional information:		~

SQL injection

Connection conn = DriverManager.getConnection("jdbs:vendor://some.database.url/name");

Statement stmt = conn.createStatement(); stmt.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM product WHERE public AND product_name LIKE '%+"+pattern+"+%'");

SQL injection

Connection conn = DriverManager.getConnection("jdbs:vendor://some.database.url/name");

PreparedStatement stmt = conn.prepareStatement(
 "SELECT * FROM product WHERE public AND product_name LIKE ?");
stmt.setString(1, pattern);
stmt.executeQuery();

Log injection

logger.info("Searching for product: {}", pattern);

Log4j API 2 Messages

logger.info("User {} has logged in using id {}", userName, loginId);

Log4j API 2 Messages

logger.info("Info {}", "\${env:ENV_VAR}");

Log4j API 2 Messages

logger.info("Info {}", "\${jndi:Idap://Idap.server.name/query}");

Log4j2 Vulnerability: How to Mitigate CVE-2021-44228 | CrowdStrike https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/log4j2-vulnerability-analysis-and-mitigation-recommendations/

 Both of the most popular Java implementations, Oracle JDK and OpenJDK, have shipped with a default setting that should prevent exploitation since 2019; the variable

com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase

is set to false by default, disallowing access to remote resources. This setting can be checked to determine if a system has been vulnerable, and set to false as a workaround to prevent attacks, for instance by logging or printing the return value of:

System.getProperty("com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase")

Log4j2 Vulnerability: How to Mitigate CVE-2021-44228 | CrowdStrike https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/log4j2-vulnerability-analysis-and-mitigation-recommendations/

A new version of Log4j 2 published on Dec. 6, 2021, introduces the following new security controls for JNDI session security controls to restrict access to remote resources:

allowedJndiProtocols restricts JNDI protocols to those listed; default: none
allowedLdapHosts restricts LDAP requests to listed hosts; default: none
allowedLdapClasses lists names of allowed remote Java classes; default: none

To prevent attacks on a network level, and the vulnerable Java service from downloading a malicious class file via LDAP, outbound connections from affected servers can be limited to trusted hosts and protocols to prevent the vulnerable Java service from downloading a malicious class file via LDAP.